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TINKERING WITH THE CONSTITUTION
There has recently been formed a society, with headquarters
in Brooklyn, having for its object the securing of an amendment
to the federal constitution. The society calls itself a "Committee
on the Federal Constitution," and the amendment which they
advocate is one providing easier modes of amendment than those
prescribed in Article V. They propose to "carry on a campaign
of education in favor of this measure through the daily and
periodical press, book and pamphlet publication, letter and
circular, and pulpit and platform." Among the members of this
committee are men of national reputation and of the highest
rank in the intellectual world. When men of this character
unite upon such an undertaking, the movement is entitled to at
least respectful consideration. And this is not the first nor the
only effort that has been made to accomplish the same object.
During the recent period of unrest through which we have been
passing, in which the courts, the constitution, and our funda-
mental political institutions generally, have been subjected to the
attacks of the muckrakers, a number of resolutions have been
introduced in congress proposing similar amendments. Such an
amendment was introduced by Senator La Follette in 1912, and
its adoption has been urged upon Congress by the legislature of
Wisconsin. And even since the adoption of the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth amendments in the single year 1913, these "gateway"
amendments are being proposed.
The theory, of course, upon which this radical change in our
fundamental law is being urged is that the constitution does not
now express the real will of the people, and that it is practically
unamenable in the modes now provided. As stated in the pub-
lished platform of the Brooklyn committee, "The people of the
United States have not control over their fundamental law at
the present time, save in a minor degree. The consequence is,
our institutions do not reflect the popular will, but in reality
other forces over which we have only a measure of control.
Our community life, therefore, is not what it would be had we
the power to shape it in our own way. We propose in this
paper briefly to inquire whether this contention is true. The
satisfactory solution of the problem will require some examination
of the history of proposed amendments to the constitution.
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When the constitution was submitted to the states in 1787 its
framers did not regard their work as final but contemplated that
amendments would be made from time to time. Accordingly
they provided in Article V a mode, or rather two modes, of
amendment. Their expectation that amendments would be pro-
posed in the future has been amply realized. While the constitu-
tion was still before the people for adoption, numerous proposals
for amendments were made by the conventions of seven of the
ratifying states, and in the first session of Congress in 1789 nearly
two hundred such proposals were introduced. Since that time
resolutions proposing amendments have been introduced in one
or more of the sessions of practically every Congress to the
present time. During the first century of the constitution, that
is, up to the close of the fiftieth Congress in March, 1889, over
sixteen hundred such resolutions were introduced in the two
houses of congress.' The number of amendments proposed in
the several Congresses presents a wide range of variation. Thus
in the case of one Congress, at least,--the thirty-fourth,--it
appears that not a single resolution to amend was introduced,
while in the sessions of the thirty-ninth Congress, during the
troubled years 1865-1867, nearly two -hundred such proposals
were made. In the fifty-second Congress seventy-three amend-
ments were proposed, and, in more recent times, during the
second session of the sixty-second Congress (December 4, 1911-
August 26, 1912) five amendments were proposed in the Senate
and twenty-eight in the House, a total of thirty-three. And
during the first session of the sixty-third Congress (April 7,
1913-December I, 1913) twelve amendments were proposed in
the Senate and forty in the House, or fifty-two in all. Of the
forty amendments proposed in the House, six were proposed
by a single representative, Mr. Hobson, of Alabama.
With Congress composed of about -five hundred and twenty-
five members, every one of whom is at liberty to introduce pro-
posals to amend the constitution, it is not surprising that several
such proposals are made at every session of Congress. It is
estimated that about thirty thousand bills are introduced during
each session, and the wonder is not that proposals to amend the
constitution have been so numerous but rather that they have
been so few.
'See Ames' Proposed Amendments to the Constitution.
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Of the hundreds of amendments that have been introduced 
in
the two houses of Congress only twenty-one have received 
the
required two-thirds vote of both houses and been submitted to 
the
states, and of the twenty-one only seventeen have been adopted.
Twelve amendments were proposed by the first Congress in 
1789,
and of these ten were adopted by 1791 as the first ten amendments.
Then followed the Eleventh (1798), Twelfth (18o4), Thirteenth
(1865), Fourteenth (i868), Fifteenth (870), Sixteenth (913)
and Seventeenth (1913) Amendments. Of the rejected amend-
ments, two were proposed by the first Congress. One of 
these,
relating to the apportionment of representatives, failed 
of adop-
tion by the ratification of only one state. The other 
related to
the compensation of members. An amendment proposed 
in i8io
provided that if any citizen of the United States 
should accept
any title of nobility from any foreign power, or, without 
the
consent of Congress, accept any present or office 
from any
foreign power, he should cease to be a citizen 
of the United
States and be incapable of holding any office thereunder. 
This
amendment likewise came within one ratification of 
adoption, and
was for some years actually supposed to be a part 
of the con-
stitution. In i86i there was proposed by Mr. 
Corwin of Ohio
an amendment prohibiting an amendment abolishing 
slavery.
This amendment was referred to with approval 
by President
Lincoln in his first inaugural address and was submitted 
to the
states. It was ratified by the legislatures of Ohio 
and Maryland
and by a convention of Illinois as the Thirteenth Amendment,
but was then lost sight of in the confusion 
of war. The
Thirteenth Amendment afterwards adopted was 
of precisely
opposite import.
From the foregoing summary it appears that the constitution
has been amended only eight times since its 
adoption in 1789.
The first ten amendments, which were all adopted 
at one time
and immediately after the constitution went 
into effect, may be
regarded as practically a part of the original constitution. 
From
the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment in 
i8o4 until 1913, a
period of io9 years, covering substantially the 
entire history of
the United States as a nation, there were but three amendments,
and these were adopted only as a result of civil 
war and practi-
cally by force of arms. Moreover, for nearly 
forty years after
the adoption of the last of the war amendments 
no proposed




In the light of these facts it is not surprising that many
thoughtful men deemed the constitution practically unamendable
under normal conditions. Thus Professor Charles A. Beard
says: "The extraordinary majorities required for the initiation
and ratification of amendments have resulted in making it practi-
cally impossible to amend the constitution under ordinary circum-
stances, and it must be admitted that only the war power in the
hands of the federal government secured the passage of the
great clauses relating to slavery and civil rights."' 2 So also Mr.
Wilson, about thirty years ago, wrote: "It would seem that no
impulse short of the impulse of self-preservation; no force less
than the force of revolution, can nowadays be expected to move
the cumbrous machinery of formal amendment erected in Article
Five. That must be a tremendous movement which can sway
two-thirds of each house of Congress and the people of three-
fourths of the states."
' 3
These expressions are fairly representative of the opinion of
students of constitutional history a few years ago. But in 1895
came the Income Tax Case in which the Supreme Court held
that the income tax law of 1894 was unconstitutional.4 No
decision since the Legal Tender Cases has attracted such general
attention, and probably none since the Dred Scott Case has been
so widely condemned. It is the one case which every soap-box
orator fulminating against the courts and the constitution can
certainly name, though probably very few even of the more
intelligent citizens could now state exactly what was decided in
that famous case. The decision may have been incorrect;
certainly competent critics have thought that in it a low water
mark was reached in the history of the Supreme Court. At any
rate, it took hold of the popular imagination. About this time
the trusts were rising into prominence. Enormous fortunes were
being quickly made by a favored few and attracting the envious
attention of the unfortunate and discontented. And if incomes
were practically untaxable by the federal government, the rich
would escape their just share of taxation. With the poor the
income tax is popular for it does not affect them. Consequently
the imposition of such a tax, since it would fall exclusively upon
the rich or well to do, appealed strongly to the great mass of
'American Government and Politics, 62.
'Congressional Government, 242.
'Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U. S. 6oi.
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the population, who were willing enough to impose a tax which
they would not be called upon to pay. A respectable sentiment
was therefore developed in favor of an amendment to the con-
stitution to authorize the imposition of an income tax, and
before the close of the year in which the decision was rendered
(1895), resolutions were introduced in both houses of Congress
to authorize the laying of an income tax without apportionment.
From time to time other resolutions to the same end were
offered, and in July, 19o9, the Sixteenth Amendment as we now
have it was passed by both houses of Congress and submitted
to the states. On February 25, 1913, Secretary of State Knox
certified that it had been ratified by the required number of states
and was a part of the constitution. The amendment was thus
adopted within about three and one-half years after it was pro-
posed by Congress, and so for the first time in forty-three years
the constitution was amended, and for the first time in over a
century it was amended except as a result of civil war. It is
not the purpose of this paper to discuss the merits of the
Sixteenth Amendment. On this point opinions may differ. The
supreme significance of the amendment is that its adoption proved
that the constitution could be peaceably amended if the people
really so desired. Forty years before the overwhelming senti-
ment of the country was against slavery, and, even without the
war, it seems certain that slavery would sooner or later have
been abolished either by an amendment to the federal constitution
or by the individual action of the slaveholding states. So also,
when the sentiment of the country was again aroused, this time
in favor of the income tax, the necessary amendment was
adopted with reasonable promptness. It would.seem that three
and one-half years is a sufficiently short time in which to make
a change in our fundamental law. But scarcely had the country
recovered from its surprise at learning that the constitution was
not in fact unamendable, when it was called on to witness an
even more rapid change. The Seventeenth Amendment provid-
ing for the election of the senators by the people passed the
Senate on June 12, 1911, and the House on May 13, 1912, on
which day it was submitted by Congress to the states. It
received the ratification of the last necessary state on May 9,
1913, and on May 3, Secretary Bryan certified that it had
become a part of the constitution. Thus the Seventeenth Amend-
ment was ratified in four days less than one year from the day
on which it was proposed, and in less than four years two
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independent and unrelated amendments were added to the con-
stitution.
Now that it has been so convincingly shown that the constitu-
tion can be peaceably amended in the constitutional mode, we
may from a somewhat different point of view re-examine the
earlier history of proposed amendments to ascertain why amend-
ments have so generally failed in the past. Time and again the
fact that about two thousand amendments had been proposed
with only fifteen adoptions, has been urged to prove that the
constitution is practically unamendable. However, upon a study
of these proposals it is found that they relate to a comparatively
small number of different subjects. Slavery alone, and the ques-
tions arising out of its abolition, have been the subject of more
than five hundred of the amendments proposed. More than this
number have been proposed relating to the executive, especially
in connection with the length of the presidential term and the
question of re-eligibility. Probably one hundred proposals were
made that senators should be elected by direct vote of the people
before this proposition was finally embodied in the Seventeenth
Amendment. Thus it appears that, while hundreds of amend-
ments have been proposed, many of them are simple repetitions,
and as a matter of fact, the number of independent propositions
of consequence has been small.
Again, when we consider the character of the amendments
proposed we find that they frequently do not represent any real
and permanent public sentiment, but embody merely the notion
of some individual congressman or a temporary popular emotion
that passes with the exciting cause. Many of the amendments
proposed are of the most trivial character or relate to matters
of detail far better left to legislation. Such are provisions
fixing the salary of the president, or defining the jurisdiction
of the inferior federal courts. More than once it has been
proposed to amend the preamble so as to include some recogni-
tion of God. What are we to think also of a proposition made
by a representative to change the name of the United States to
"America"? More serious perhaps is Representative Victor
Berger's proposal to abolish the senate. The character of the
amendments proposed is naturally largely determined by the
trend of public sentiment at the time, and often popular fads
find expression in resolutions to amend the constitution. Of
late there has been a disposition to make the impeachment of
judges easier, and even to introduce into the federal system the
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recall of judicial decisions, or the referendum. Before these
innovations have been given an adequate trial by the states it
is proposed to adopt them for the national government. Most
of the proposed amendments die in the committees to which
they are referred. Very few have sufficient merit to come to
a vote.
As just suggested, the proposals to amend the constitution
reflect in their nature the temper of the times. At certain
periods, owing to political or economic conditions, the constitution
attracts to an unusual degree the attention of the people, and
amendments are proposed to meet the supposed needs of the day.
The most conspicuous instance of this is found in the amendments
relating to slavery. Very few amendments on this subject were
introduced prior to i86o, but from the opening of the second
session of the thirty-sixth Congress in December, i86o, they
were offered in great numbers, mainly in the vain hope of avert-
ing a conflict between the sections. About two hundred resolu-
tions affecting slavery were proposed during this session,
including the Corwin amendment prohibiting federal interference
tterewith. The final result of this activity was the adoption of
the three war amendments. The Eleventh Amendment was
occasioned by the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia that a state
might be sued in a federal court by a citizen of another state.
Again, the deadlock in the presidential election of 18oo led to
numerous proposals to change the mode of selecting the president,
resulting finally in the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment. In
most cases none of the amendments suggested to meet needs
supposed at the time to be imperative have been adopted.
Generally it has been found after the temporary conditions of
unrest have disappeared, that the proposed amendments were
not needed and that the constitution has been adequate as it
stood. Thus after the "salary grabs" by Congress in 1816 and
1873, when Congress increased its own compensation, amend-
ments were introduced providing that such increases should not
take effect until after the succeeding election of representatives.
These, however, were not adopted, simpler expedients being
resorted to. In the first instance the offending representatives
were not re-elected and in the second case Congress itself took
the hint and repealed the objectionable law. We may note, how-
ever, that an amendment to this effect was one of the twelve
proposed .by the first Congress but was rejected by the states.
The veto power of the president has quite frequently been the
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subject of proposed amendments. The frequent use of this power
by Presidents Jackson and Tyler led to a number of attempts to
curb the power. On other occasions the agitation has been for
the enlargement of the power, especially by enabling the president
to veto certain items in a bill, notably in appropriation bills, while
approving the rest. Again, upon the failure of the impeachment
proceedings against Judge Chase in 1805, John Randolph, in
his disappointment, immediately introduced a resolution for the
removal of judges on the joint address of both houses of Con-
gress, and the next year re-introduced the same amendment. In
the next six years nine other amendments for the removal of
judges were proposed. Then the excitement on this line sub-
sided, and except for several such proposals scattered over a
long period of years, no such agitation has occurred until the
recent notorious attack upon the judiciary began. It now seems
that the recent removal of one judge by impeachment and the
disciplining of several others have taken the point out of the
proposition to amend the constitution in this particular. The
amendments proposed illustrate what Carl Schurz describes as
"the dangerous tendency of that impulsive statesmanship which
will resort to permanent changes in the constitution of the state
in order to accomplish temporary objects." 5
The federal constitution has so far been a fairly stable docu-
ment. It has never been revised as a whole, and has been
changed by amendment in only a few particulars. It has happily
escaped the fate that has befallen the constitutions of the states.
Not only are they subject to constant change, but they have
long since ceased to be constitutions in a true sense. Instead
of embodying broad general propositions of fundamental per-
manent law, they now exhibit the prolixity of a code and consist
largely of mere legislation. No one now entertains any particular
respect for a state constitution. It has little more dignity than
an ordinary act of the legislature. In Oregon, according to
Judge Moore of the Oregon supreme court, "it requires no more
effort nor any greater care to amend a clause of the constitution
than it does to enact, alter, or repeal a statute." In similar
strain the attorney general of Oklahoma once declared in a
public address that it was easier to amend the constitution of that
state than to amend a statute of the state legislature and took
'Quoted in Ames' Proposed Amendments to the Constitution, 132.
'State v. Schlier, 59 Ore. 18.
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less time. If this be correct, it would seem that the degradation
of the state constitution could no further go. The constitution
of the United States is justly regarded as the greatest instrument
of government ever ordained by man. For more than a century
it stood almost unchanged. Some of the greatest judges in
history have interpreted and applied its provisions and in their
decisions have developed an unequalled system of constitutional
law. It is not true, as is often asserted, that Marshall and his
associates and successors have strained the constitution and
wrested it from its original character and made a new constitu-
tion. The constitution, in essentials, means to-day what it meant
one hundred years age. The great principles of human liberty
which it embodies are eternal; new conditions may arise calling
for new or enlarged applications of these principles, but, with
the exception of a few matters covered by the three war amend-
ments, no important addition to the constitution has been made
in a century and none has been imperatively needed.
A constitution to be respected as fundamental law must possess
in a reasonable degree the quality of permanence. Of course
it should not be incapable altogether of being changed to meet
new conditions, but just as each new exception weakens the
force of a rule, so new amendments tend to impair the dignity
of a constitution. Any unnecessary amendment is a distinct
injury, and wherever the object sought can be accomplished in
some other way, the constitution ought not to be amended. Thus
if Congress has the power to do by legislation what the amend-
ment is intended to accomplish, it is both useless and harmful
to alter the fundamental law for this purpose. For example,
amendments prescribing the details of the jurisdiction of the
inferior federal courts, which have been proposed, are objec-
tionable on this ground, since the jurisdiction of these courts is
already entirely subject to the control of Congress. So also of
proposed amendments fixing the salary of the president, or the
compensation of members of Congress. Amendments of this
character are subject to the further objection that they relate
to details. To admit such amendments in a constitution which,
"from its nature deals in generals, not in details," would cause
it soon "to partake of the prolixity of a legal code." Equally
objectionable on this general ground are amendments to accom-
plish results which may be accomplished by state action, of
which conspicuous instances are found in the numerous amend-
ments relating to woman's suffrage, prohibition, and marriage
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and divorce. This class of amendments may be even more
objectionable in that they impair the sovereignty of the states
without any commensurate gain.
No one would contend that an amendment embodying the
real will of the people should not be added to the constitution
provided the same object cannot readily be attained in some
other way. The trouble is that the people have rarely come to
any general agreement as to what changes they wished made
in the constitution. Probably no matters have been more fre-
quently the subjects of proposed amendments than the mode of
electing the president and the presidential term. These topics
seem to be of perennial interest. It has been stated that no
question gave the framers of the constitution so much trouble as
the question of the method of choosing the executive. The
indirect method finally selected by the convention worked
smoothly only so long as Washington consented to serve as
president, and even before the electoral vote in the election of
1796 had been counted, an amendment changing the mode of
voting was proposed. The question was not settled by the
adoption of the Twelfth Amendment in 18o4. Since then many
amendments have been proposed on this subject. Up to 1889
thirty-seven amendments were proposed for the election of the
president by the direct vote of the people, the first of these
having been offered in 1826. But the abolition of the present
mode of electing the president seems not probable in the near
future. No other plan yet proposed has met with general
approval, and the fact that the constitution is already practically
changed in this respect and the president elected by popular
vote seems to satisfy the people. Amendments to change the
mode of election are still being proposed but the people are not
interested in the subject. Of late much more attention has
been paid to the presidential term and the question of re-eligibility.
Up to 1889 about one hundred and twenty-five amendments had
been submitted on these subjects, and others are added at practi-
cally every session of Congress. The favorite proposition is to
fix the term at six years, usually with a provision that the
president shall not be eligible to reelection. But even on these
questions the people have not made up their minds, or rather
they seem to prefer to determine these questions as to any
particular president upon the merits of the individual case. If
they think the term of a particular executive too short, they
reelect him for another four years. If they think he ought
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not to be reelected, they, by their vote, declare him ineligible.
And perhaps it is best to leave the matter as it stands. Certainly
no formal prohibition of a third term has yet been necessary.
Another favorite amendment is that giving the president power
to veto a single section of a bill which he otherwise approves,
particularly to veto items in appropriation bills. There seems
to be much in this proposition to commend it, but the subject
does not appeal to the people. It excites no popular interest and
will therefore probably not soon be adopted. And there is high
authority against it. Mr. Taft in his speech at the University
of Virginia in January, 1915, said: "While it would be useful
for the executive to have the power of partial veto, I am not
entirely sure that it would be a safe provision. It would greatly
enlarge the influence of the president already large enough. I
am inclined to think it is better to trust to the action of the
people in condemning the party which becomes responsible for
'riders' than to give in such a powerful instrument a temptation
to its sinister use by a president eager for continued political
success." In the same address Mr. Taft favored a limitation
of the president's tenure of office to a single term of seven years.
The two proposed amendments now most prominently before
the public are those relating to woman suffrage and national
prohibition. As both these subjects appeal strongly to large
numbers of persons, the proposition to amend the constitution
along these lines has aroused unusual interest. So great is
the interest in prohibition especially that it is not impossible
that the prohibition amendment may be ultimately adopted. In
the writer's judgment neither amendment would be proper.
Without any reference to the merits of the two questions in
the abstract, it would seem that there is no occasion to amend
the constitution to secure either of the objects aimed at, for both
are attainable without a constitutional amendment. Any state
that desires woman suffrage can adopt it for itself whenever it
wishes to do so. No national aid is required. Moreover, the
franchise is a matter which belongs peculiarly to the states, and
unless it is desired to impair the autonomy of the states and
centralize the government even more than has yet been done,
a provision on woman suffrage has no place in the federal con-
stitution. The experiments with the suffrage question in the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were not so successful
as to invite other adventures in that field. The practical nullifica-
tion of these provisions meets with general satisfaction, and their
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formal repeal has more than once been proposed. The first
woman suffrage amendment, it may be remarked, was likewise
a product of the reconstruction Period, having been introduced
in 1866. Since then numerous amendments on this subject have
been proposed, and on January 12, 1915, such an amendment
was rejected by the House of Representatives by a vote of 2o4
to 174.
The first prohibition amendment was proposed in 1876, but
no special interest was taken in the subject until quite recently,
such amendments being quite frequently proposed at present.
On December 22, 1914, Mr. Hobson's resolution proposing an
amendment for nationwide prohibition received a majority of
197 to 189 votes. The strength shown in this vote indicates
the hold which the prohibition sentiment has gained, and it
would not be surprising to see this amendment adopted. How-
ever, it is unnecessary, and for that reason at least is objec-
tionable. As in the case of woman suffrage, each state may
adopt prohibition for itself, as many have done, and reenforced
by acts of Congre~s state prohibition can readily be made
effective, if, indeed, any prohibition law could be enforced. But
even if it be desired to control the matter by a national law,
Congress already has power to enact the necessary legislation.
Through its control of interstate commerce and the postal service,
and by the exercise of the taxing power, if necessary, Congress
can put an end to the liquor traffic just as it has suppressed
lotteries and oleomargarine disguised as butter and regulated
the trade in foods and drugs. The prohibition of the transporta-
tion of liquor in interstate commerce or by mail, and the refusal
to carry liquor advertisementg or orders or newspapers contain-
ing such advertisements in the mails, and also the imposition
of a prohibitive tax on the manufacture and sale of liquor,
would soon put an end to the business. This, at any rate,
seems as far as the federal government should go in the matter.
National prohibition was vigorously denounced by Mr. Taft
in a recent speech in Boston, in which he said: "It would
revolutionize the national government. It would put on the
shoulders of the government the duty of sweeping the doorsteps
of every home in the land. If national prohibition legislation
is passed, local government would be destroyed. And when
you destroy local government -you destroy one of the things
which go to make for a healthy condition of national govern-
ment. National prohibition is not enforceable; it is a confession
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on the part of the state governments of inability to control and
regulate their own especial business and duty."
Another proposed amendment somewhat akin to the foregoing
is the amendment to authorize a national marriage and divorce
law. At present, of course, Congress has no power to legislate
on the subject of marriage and divorce, and the extent of the
divorce evil is a matter of general notoriety. Also it is well
known that marriage may be held valid in one state and void
in another, thus giving rise to various complications as to
inheritance, and other questions. But public attention has been
especially directed to the evil of the practice of obtaining divorces
on a pretended residence in a state other than the domicile of the
plaintiff, as in the case of many of the divorces obtained at
Reno and other jurisdictions having loose divorce laws. It is
likely that this particular branch of the divorceevil is of far
less consequence than is commonly supposed, that such divorces
constitute a small part of the total number of divorces granted,
and that the divorce evil is due far less to differences of state
laws than to other causes. But even admitting the evil of the
so-called "migratory divorces," no national legislation is necessary
to put an end to them. As the law now stands no state is
compelled to recognize a divorce obtained in a state where the
plaintiff was not bona fide domiciled. This has been expressly
held by the Supreme Court in several cases.
7 That such divorces
are tolerated and the parties permitted to marry again without
being prosecuted for bigamy, is simply because public sentiment
sanctions such marriages and no one cares enough for good
morals to have the parties prosecuted. Further, marriage is
recognized as the very foundation of society, and this matter
is too vital to be surrendered by the states. A national law
would have to operate uniformly over the entire country, and
a majority in Congress could easily force upon the southern
states, where negroes are numerous, the intermarriage of whites
and blacks by the votes of representatives from states where
there are few negroes. So also California might be compelled
to recognize the intermarriage of whites and Chinese by the votes
of representatives from other states where there are practically
no Chinese. An amendment prohibiting polygamy has been
several times proposed in order to enable the federal government
to suppress polygamy in states where it is sanctioned or tolerated.
IBell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175; Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U. S. 179.
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To this amendment there would seem to be no serious objection,
but probably there is not sufficient general interest in the subject
to secure its adoption.
It might have been expected that the almost uniform failure
of proposed amendments to secure adoption would lead to fre-
quent attempts to simplify the mode of amendment. Such,
however, has not been the case. The first proposal to change
the method of amendment was made by the Rhode Island con-
vention which ratified the constitution in 179o. This proposal
was to make amendment more difficult by providing that no
amendment should be made without the consent of eleven of the
original states. No effort to make amendment easier seems to
have been made until 1864 and again in 1873, in which years
resolutions reducing the veto required for adoption were intro-
duced. These resolutions never came to a vote in Congress.
Of late several such resolutions have been proposed, as already
mentioned above. Prior to the adoption of the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Amendments there may have appeared to be some
necessity for an amendment providing an easier method of
amendment, but that there was in fact no such necessity experi-
ence has now abundantly shown. And in the judgment of the
writer such an amendment is not only not necessary but
dangerous.
No amendment embodies so much potential danger as an
amendment making the constitution so easily amended that it
may be changed by a minority, or even by a majority, of the
people to suit every passing fancy. The constitution would soon
be reduced to practically the level of the constitutions of the
states if a very easy mode of amendment were adopted. At
one time, as we have seen, thoughtful men were of opinion that
the constitution was practically unamendable and that a simpler
mode of amendment was necessary unless the constitution were
to remain unchanged except by judicial amendment and practical
evasions. There is no longer reasonable ground for any such
opinion. The people have shown that they can promptly amend
their constitution by doing it.
There is no great difficulty in securing the adoption of any
amendment that a decided majority of the people of the United
States really want, and certainly no other amendment should be
added. It has been assumed by the advocates of some of the
proposals for simplifying the method of amendment that a
majority ought to determine the organic law, but this view
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ignores one of the fundamental objects of a constitution, that
is, the protection of the minority against the majority. This
is amply secured by the requirements of Article V. It is
impossible to amend the constitution without sufficient delibera-
tion to enable the people to form an intelligent opinion on the
subject. The constitutional safeguards of our liberties cannot
be overthrown at the passing whim of a fickle majority. It is
fortunate indeed that it was not possible to put through some
of the amendments aimed at the judiciary during the recent
wave of insanity on that subject that is only now subsiding.
It has more than once been pointed out that a small minority
of the voters of the country, by being aptly distributed in the
smaller states, may defeat an amendment favored by a great
majority of the people. It might with equal propriety be sug-
gested that the proper distribution of a few votes might some-
times change the result of a presidential election. But such
a possibility is inevitable unless state lines are to be wiped out
and the country treated as a unit. Moreover it is none the less
true that it is theoretically possible to adopt an amendment to
the constitution against the wishes of the twelve most populous
states having an aggregate population of more than half the
population of the United States. That is, an amendment might
be adopted by a minority of the voters of the country. But
juggling of this sort constitutes no argument.
The prompt adoption of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amend-
ments proves that the constitution can be amended within a
reasonable time even under normal conditions. It is true that
these amendments were first proposed long before they were
adopted, but this lipse of time was not because the process of
amendment is difficult but because time is inevitably required to
develop a sentiment in favor of a proposed change however
simple the mode of adoption may be. The Sixteenth Amend-
ment was adopted eighteen years after the decision in the Income
Tax Case, which in normal times is as promptly as could be
expected. Even the Spanish War did not so embarrass the
government as to make the need of an income tax seem urgent.
Great nations think slowly, and taxation is a dull subject.
The development of a sentiment for the Seventeenth Amend-
ment was naturally not so rapid; the question involved was far
more complex. The election of senators by popular vote was
first proposed in 1826, but for nearly fifty years the proposition
excited little interest. Previous to 1872 nine resolutions on the
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subject were introduced, but about that time the subject took
a strong hold upon the people and in the next seventeen years
the change was proposed about thirty times. In the first session
of the fifty-second Congress twenty-five resolutions on the subject
were introduced. The legislatures of several states recommended
the amendment.8 Finally under the pressure of increasing
popular demand the amendment was several times passed by the
House, and at last, in 1911, passed the Senate also. Within one
year of its final passage by the House (May 13, 1912) it was
ratified by the last necessary state, and on May 31, 1913, declared
in force. Considering the nature of the question it would seem
that in this case also the amendment was adopted with reasonable
promptness. When the ratification of the required three-fourths
of the states can be obtained within twelve months there is
little room to complain. In the words of Mr. Justice Holmes,
"a state cannot be expected to move with the celerity of a private
business man; it is enough if it proceeds, in the language of
the English chancery, with all deliberate speed." 9 If this remark
is apt when applied to one of the states, it is even more so
when applied to the United States.
The great lesson of the war amendments is that amendments
should not be made hastily or in the height of popular excite-
ment. Already it has been proposed to repeal the Fifteenth
Amendment and certain portions of the Fourteenth. They have
never really been operative. The first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment is a most important and meritorious addition to the
Constitution, though open to criticism in respect to its provision
relating to citizenship. But that this amendment should have
merit is a happy accident. It did not accomplish the purpose
for which it was forced upon the states, but, in a way of which
its authors doubtless never dreamed, it has had a tremendous
and, on the whole, a beneficent effect. It was intended to secure
certain rights and privileges to the negro; it failed of this
purpose, but it revolutionized the relations of the state and the
national governments. It gave the Supreme Court the veto
power over all state legislation and greatly increased its appel-
late jurisdiction over the proceedings of the state courts. Thus
in their efforts, under stress of passion, to promote, as they
supposed, the interests of the negro, the authors of this amenid-
'Ames' Proposed Amendments, 61.
'Virginia v. West Virginia, 222 U. S. 17.
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ment unwittingly effected a revolution in our government. Yet
they did not accomplish what they aimed at.
It is a serious matter to amend our fundamental law. As
in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment, momentous conse-
quences may lurk unsuspected in amendments innocent on their
face. The burden is upon those who claim that the constitution
is inadequate or outgrown to show wherein this is true. What
amendments would they propose? Would the amendments pro-
posed by one critic be acceptable to another? We suspect that
most of the changes advocated by the various critics have
already been proposed time and again in Congress without
attracting serious attention. Such changes could not be secured
however simple the mode of amendment. As already shown,
changes really desired by the great body of the people may be
made by the present method without serious difficulty. The
constitution is not perfect. The result of compromise in the
first instance, it is not the embodiment of a philosophic scheme
of government but a working instrument of practical statesman-
ship. In the hands of the Supreme Court it has been admirably
fitted to the needs of successive generations of our people.
When necessary, or when the people really desire it, it can be
amended. The present mode of amendment assures its stability
while permitting natural evolution; a simpler mode might work
its destruction.
Jos. R. LONG.
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